From ‘Multiculturalism’ to ‘Interculturalism’ – A commentary on the Impact of De-racing and De-classing the Debate*

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Abstract
Recent discourses surrounding the so-called death or decline of multiculturalism are characterised by a movement towards notions and practices of ‘Interculturality’, ‘Interculturalism’ and what have been called ‘new frameworks’ for diversity and race. The contemporary socio-cultural landscape is characterised by the persistence of racism, both institutionally and interactionally embedded, which is increasingly re-generated on the political European stage. In this paper I argue that more vigilance may be required before a wholesale acceptance of these ‘new frameworks’ is mobilised. The rise of Interculturalism in un-nuanced forms is underwritten by parallel processes of anti-multiculturalism, cultural racism, and the demise of the spaces within which the class-race dialectic can be articulated. Finally, the policy gaze has both racialised the debate on cultural difference using the focus on particular ‘different’ groups, and deemed other black and minority ethnic groups as officially less troublesome. I argue that this economically and politically expedient rendition of the sociocultural landscape leads to a distorted analysis of differential subjugation. In an apparently ‘post-race’ era of diversity, racialised experiences need to be articulated more richly and with more political weight than interculturalism may currently facilitate.

Keywords: multiculturalism, interculturalism, race, intersectionality

‘Thank God the athletes have arrived! Now we can move on from leftie multicultural crap. Bring back red arrows, Shakespeare and the Stones...!’
Aidan Burley, (UK Conservative MP)

‘To put it bluntly, most of us prefer our own kind’.
David Goodhart (Author)

Introduction
Aidan Burley’s remarks broadcast through Twitter during the 2012 Olympiad (Watt 2012) focus our attention on a number of issues in contemporary society, with the games as the backdrop against which nationalist and conservative political ideology is highlighted. This is set against the ‘obituary’ of ‘multiculturalism’ as announced by political leaders such as David Cameron (BBC News Online 2011) and Angela Merkel (BBC News Online 2010). Contemporary debates offer a variety of analyses and formulations about citizenship, identity, belonging and difference. How the idea of difference is translated into both everyday encounters as well as institutional experience in society is a much debated spectacle. Often it reveals overt outright rejections of ‘race’, ‘racism’, and ethnicity based divides, as well as loudly indicating that well-

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worn tropes of racialised identity are never too far away from rhetoric and practice, as exemplified in the ‘raciological meanings’ of Cameron’s 2011 speech (Gilroy 2012). The re-emergence of cultural racism framed as the politics of citizenship, rights and ‘reasonable prejudice’ of some far right groups, such as the English Defence League, has become a particularly problematic trope used in tandem by political parties such as United Kingdom Independence Party. Since the English northern disturbances in early 2001, then later in the same year, the terrorist attacks that constitute the ‘9/11’ event, the nature of practical, political and symbolic processing of differences – religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and geo-political – have been the focus of media and government surveillance. Indeed, the constant focus on ‘Muslims’ in national policy and media is the topic of much academic debate, especially as related to perceived threats to ‘security’ – the securitisation of minority populations, and the securitisation of race policy (Fekete 2004, 2011).

In this paper, I do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of neither the rise of Islamophobia, nor reproduce the many detailed discussions of both multiculturalism and interculturalism. Rather, I intend to contextualise the current UK policy announcements and ‘citizenship’ based formulations of difference against the backdrop of a de-racing argument. By this, I mean that critiques of multiculturalism have moved away from the existence of the acknowledgment of enduring racialised experiences, towards ‘new’ ideas about diversity.

This paper aims to first briefly highlight some salient critiques of ‘new’ frameworks of diversity such as Interculturalism, which attempt to deal with the inevitability of cultural diversity (Parekh 2000a) against the scenery painted above. I will not provide a blow by blow account of the debate, but rather utilise the literature to frame my main critique. Several aspects of Interculturalism will be highlighted as items specifically moving away from what are known as intersectional analyses, and the resultant ‘de-classing’ and ‘de-racing’ tendency. Such moves are seen as expediently justified in the face of new modes of neo-liberalised global capital and labour exchange but remain precariously perched on problematic race and ethnicity notions.

Secondly, as the shift towards political and policy interculturalism tilts towards citizenship and universalist values oriented discourse, so the debate moves to a more fixed, non-intersectional analysis of difference. I argue that, whilst not completely absent from the debate, intersectional analyses which utilise the complexity of class, race and gender (to name but three of many) have gradually been marginalised in intercultural framed work despite academic and activist attempts.

Thirdly, the paper attempts to identify the parallel yet thus far invisible process of some minority groups becoming more visible and ‘problematised’, while others seemingly perform a disappearing act, deemed ‘correctly’ or ‘safely’ integrated. This contrasts with other groups constructed as ‘troublesome’ or examples of ‘poor’ integration. This conspicuous absence is highlighted as having an impact on the landscape of multi-cultural negotiation, and forms an integral strand of the history of race politics. Recent negative, ideological constructions of Muslims in the UK (and Europe), as well as much needed reactions from academics intending to contest these negative constructions may have left their mark on the multicultural landscape in the form of homegenising and neglecting the existence of problems in these other, ‘other’ communities. These focuses for the paper are brought together in the service of raising some questions around the continued death-knell of multiculturalism, the wholesale and unquestioned acceptance of interculturalism as a framework for diversity, and the related co-opting and officialised acceptance of some forms of cultural difference rather than others.

Situating the Critiques of Multiculturalism
As formulations about the nature of belonging and the negotiation of ‘multiple identities’ circulate within debates, highly politicised philosophi-
cal moves regarding duties, rights and responsibilities render this arena ever more complex. In this section, I want to outline interrelated areas of the critique of multiculturalism, development of community cohesion, and some of the problems with these entities.

The various attacks on multiculturalism are a feature of contemporary debates and neither new nor surprising, given the force of politically expedient shifts to the right. The critiques have been gaining momentum in recent years, but can be traced back to the reaction to the urban disorders in the UK cities of Bradford and Oldham, in 2001 and the 9/11 and 7/7 bombings in New York and London. The complex, prevailing and contested idea of ‘integration’, as Rattansi (2011) surmises was already on the wane, resulting in questions about who is to be integrated into what, and how this might be effected in egalitarian and fair terms. The multidimensional nature of ‘integration’, having spatial, structural and cultural levels to contend with resulted in numerous ‘warnings’ and reports, for example those commissioned by the UK Home Office (Cantle 2001). The perceived result of multicultural policies stemming back to the 1980s was identified as the lessening of integration between groups of collective identities. The assumption underlying this unravelling of cohesion was that culturally bounded groups would remain only within the social and psychological confines of their own group, and the reduced integration would cause more problems in society. The public disorders in Northern cities were seen as evidence of this new problematic (Hussain and Bagguley 2005).

However, the critique of multiculturalism as an approach appears a while before the current identity laden ‘moral panics’ that we see in the media and various policy formulations. As Kymlicka (2012) reminds us, in 2008, the Council for Europe generated and discussed the White Paper on ‘Intercultural Dialogue’ in which the preferred model for dealing with the so-called failures of post-war multicultural segregation would be ‘interculturalism’. The focus in the White Paper is, as Kymlicka emphatically indicates the generalised and vague notion that interculturalism may provide a platform for understanding diversity whilst maintaining a framework of universal values. So, the critiques of multiculturalism pre-date the current panic, and yet, as a variety of writers have argued (Meer and Modood 2012b; Kymlicka 2012; Werbner 2012; Lentin and Tittley 2011), there appears to be an oversimplification of both multiculturalism and interculturalism, as well as an avoidance to explore fundamental similarities. Other writers have also pointed out that situating the two approaches in competing positions is neither helpful nor conceptually accurate since there are different versions of both approaches (Gomarasca 2013). I would like, therefore, to contextualise what Werbner has called the ‘failure-of-multiculturalism’ discourse (2012: 201). The ideological move away from constructing groups as bounded entities (a typically simplistic caricature of multiculture) to a more ‘integrationist’ model of sociality was overtaken by the ‘community cohesion’ approach, itself the result of a number of reports written in the wake of the urban disorders (Denham 2001; Cantle 2001). The reports proposed the notion of ‘community cohesion’ as a way of building bridges between groups who were said to be “sleep walking into segregation…” and living “parallel lives” (Philips 2005). Trevor Philips’s infamous, often cited and selectively employed observation of black, minority and white community interactions in the UK under so-called ‘multiculturalism’ both fuelled pre-existing fears (worked on partly by discourse surrounding the northern disorders of 2001) and gave rise to new, more powerful, and intuitively attractive discourses of difference. The healing solution was said, certainly by adherents and proponents of community cohesion, to be a common ground on which to unite social and cultural futures. As Rattansi (2011) has argued, this form of bridge building rests on three main drivers – communitarianism, Putnam’s theoretical extension of ‘social capital’, and the experiences of the white working classes. The problems with these cohesion based underpinnings have been discussed in more detail else-
where (e.g. Crowley and Hickman 2008; Philips 2006; Amin 2002). These involve the complex and dynamic notion of ‘community’ being reified and rendered static; social capital mobilised as a subtle form of recycling culturalist arguments about prescriptive norms of integration; and the homogenised and simplified construction of the white working class experience, placed in contrast to the experiences of other minority communities. In a similar vein, Battercharya’s critique contests the use of ethnicity ‘as the source of antagonisms and differences that must be overcome’, and instead suggests that ‘ethnicity is itself multiple and changing and is unlikely to be a basis for articulating shared values’ (2009: 4).

The European idea of ‘Interculturalism’ is viewed as a remedy for some of the problems which previous approaches seemed to be plagued by (James 2009). Before multiculturalism was embraced in the UK (noting the discursive and multiple constructions of this practice), the dominant counter hegemonic political resistance was driven by the machinery of ‘anti-racisms’, much of it mobilised by organisations such as the Institute of Race Relations and various grassroots organisations (Farrar 2004). This particular mode of resistance through representing and amplifying the voices of oppressed minorities was underwritten by the tacit identity agreement which combined the experiences of all racial and ethnic minorities. This political and practical unity, while not unproblematic (Modood 1994), served as a basis for both grassroots organisation of resistance, as well as representation in local and national politics (see Virdee 2010). As socio-economic and political landscapes shifted, so did official reactions to the ‘diversity issue’. The caricatured identity-politics of ‘crude multiculturalism’, as it has been termed, came to replace the class-race conscious alliances with separate group identity movements (Lentin 2008). This movement should not be understood as linear and mutually exclusive segmentation, and is rather a dialectically tensions position, as discussed by Farrar (2004). The spaces left behind by ideologies and conceptualisations of racial difference and equality were filled in each era by these tensions; on the one hand, with resistance and activist movements, and on the other, with politically motivated discourse from the right. Interculturalism, therefore, appears to offer some form of relief to the political indigestion caused by unwanted, problematic ‘others’, certainly re-framing the problem of minority-majority culture.

The ubiquity of ‘community cohesion’ as state policy is evidenced in both the organisations charged with investigating public disorders in Northern cities as well as the various government backed ‘cohesion’ initiatives. The generalised ‘trickle down’ idea of culturalised capital-based deficit amongst affected communities appears to have facilitated a transition to ‘new frameworks for race and diversity’ (Cantle 2008) and the ‘new era of cohesion and diversity’ (Cantle 2012). Discussions around Interculturalism (Cantle 2001, 2012; Modood and Meer 2008; Rattansi 2011; James 2008, 2009), while relatively young in the UK, have traditionally had a variety of purchases in many countries, including Canada and Australia in varying guises, and employing differing social and psychological emphases. Certainly a key example of the national policy utilisation of an intercultural framework can be found in Quebec’s approach to diversity situated in contrast to Canada’s federal multicultural approach (Meer 2014). The sheer range and diversity of ideas within the broad label ‘interculturalism’ prohibits an extensive discussion here, but I will firstly select some defining features and then move onto discussing their implications.

In providing an extensive critical discussion of where interculturalism and multiculturalism overlap and differ, Meer and Modood (2012a; 2012b) initiate a welcome appraisal of the debate. I will draw on Meer and Modood’s (2012a; 2012b) comparisons between the two approaches, since they have clearly defined the relevant parameters for engagement in this area. They outline four main issues in relation to this comparison that need tackling, as follows: communication and dialogue as a defining feature
of intercultural nature as opposed to multicultural-ism; ‘less groupist and culture bound’, therefore more interactive; reinforces a stronger sense of national identity through cohesion; and, finally, that interculturalism is more likely to prevent illiberal practices within cultures. The authors go on in a number of publications to systematically tackle these issues. I will not rehearse the intricacies of Meer and Modood’s exposition but will draw upon it to make my central points.

**Defining Interculturalism**

A key feature of interculturalism, as defined by James, is ‘...its sense of openness, dialogue and interaction’ (2008: 2). As critics of multicultural-ism allege that it has stunted interactive diversity, interculturalism is framed as a way to reinstate the fluidity of culture. Indeed, a prominent fea-ture of the move-on from the so-called corpse of multiculturalism towards interculturalism is the absorption of sociological and social psychological ideas. For James, there is something to be gained in using social psychological work in reduc-ing prejudice through contact (the “contact the-sis”), the principal idea being that contact, in vari-ous forms between different people and groups will, in ‘optimal’ circumstances, reduce prejudice and negative stereotypes (Hewstone et al. 2007). James (2008) summarises a number of important perspectives, including Parekh’s (2000b) inter-active multiculturalism, Gilroy’s (2004) planetary humanism in a cosmopolitanised world, Brah’s work (1996) on diaspora and space and Sen’s (2006) wide ranging and multidisciplinary work within human rights and global conflict arenas. James identifies Sen’s singular toxicity towards cultural theorists for being the drivers of a move-ment which ultimately extract real people, living real lives from their social action, and place them in preconceived categories of civilisation, thus ignoring all diversity within and between groups. Certainly, in multidisciplinary understandings of race relations and discrimination, such integra-tions of psycho-social frameworks are laudable and frequently used. Exploring the multifaceted and shifting nature of identity as a lived, dynamic human sociality is integral. In addition, if notions of identity are to be underlined by a complex interplay of individual rights, responsibilities and communitarian agendas, then people should also equally be given the opportunity to opt out of intercultural dialogue. James’s (2009) summary is a considered discussion of the pitfalls associ-ated with creating policy in relation to culture, citizenship and collective egalitarian cooperation and that intercultural work of any kind needs to be premised on notions of identity, culture and difference which are not racialised.

One of the key functions of interculturalism is communicative and dialogic nature of its pro-gramme, but the dialogic and cultural exchange propensities of multiculturalism have been staunchly defended by writers, such as Meer and Modood (2012a; 2012b). The way in which multi-culturalism has made dialogue and communica-tion central to its concerns seems to have been ignored, and replaced by a caricature of multiculturalism as a static and separatist dividing force. As Parekh (2000b) asserted, there is an inherent value in different cultures coming across each other and experiencing both uncertainty as well as learning to identify those aspects of their cul-ures which are different and importantly valued differentially. This fundamental aspect of multi-culturalism speaks to the embedded compo-nents of dialogue and communication, as well as the crucial aspects of what Taylor identified as respect and dignity (Taylor 1994). Similarly, as Gomarasca (2013) has pointed out dialogue is not the sole character of interculturality, but is part of every culture. The presence of intercul-tural dialogue playing a role in ‘creative spaces’ may not be quite enough to mitigate the ever persistent and hugely damaging issues of institu-tional and individual racism.

As I mention earlier in relation to Meer and Modood’s work, one of the defining, citizen-ship fuelled drivers of intercultural frameworks, certainly as proposed by Cantle (2008; 2012), is the need to subscribe to a national identity, whilst acknowledging cultural and ethnic differ-ences. Such uniting glue (Bourne 2007) would
then function as a way of bridging the perceived gaps and separations that appear to have been generated by people living in cultural silos. The problems with this are numerous (elaborated by Meer and Modood 2012a; 2012b), but focus on the assertion by authors such as Modood (2007) that multiculturalism has already been and continues to be at the forefront of allowing expressions of cultural identity; it also simultaneously advocates a series of national narratives which are inclusive, and not dependent on essentialising, nationalist notions of majoritarian belonging (CMEB 2000).

The charge of illiberality and relativism often circulates within the discourse of culture, citizenship and rights, and has forcefully emerged in relation to caricatured Muslim communities. This is contested through the example of Muslim claims being characterised as difficult to accommodate because of the perceived ways in which the faith imposes limits on individual rights. Meer and Modood (2012b.) argue that through this negative association between Muslim groups and ‘illiberality’, a sense of ‘otherness’ is perpetuated, one which invokes a variety of related misconceptions. For example, some practices which are perceived to be sourced in religious orthodoxy are actually cultural in their formation and origin (e.g. forced marriages, clitoridectomy), and would be more effectively eliminated using religion rather than condemning faith based practices. Similarly, the increasingly public issue of faith schools appears to have been carried along by the misconception that a community’s needs for specific requirements to be met are ‘cultural’, when in fact as research (Pecenka and Anthias 2014) indicates, these requests are more to do with securing future opportunities for young people within a community. From this reading, some consideration needs to be made in moving wholesale and uncritically from notions of multiculturalism to interculturalism. The contingent and shifting nature of the internal and external organisation of ideas of cannot be reduced to a single dialogic, intercultural space. Rather, it needs to be placed in the same intellectual and policy equation as the persistent legacies of colonial and imperial histories.

One of the problems with the vague basis of interculturally framed interventions this is that it does not appear to specify the mechanisms of creating the appropriate conditions for change. The proposed shift in thinking about identity in this direction towards a nuanced, context rich and agency-structure informed analysis is something sociologists and political scientists have been focusing on for many decades. The dynamic complexities of identity, as well the enduring social, cultural, psychological and economic legacies of empire would need to be translated into radical modification in political representation and a connected redistribution of resources. Such vigilance against structural inequalities and connected discriminatory practices are necessarily connected to multicultural diversity, not separate. Interculturalism’s focus on global, ‘translocalational’ (Anthias 2001) identities as newly formed, liberating articulations of identity which can transcend prejudicial dispositions echoes the transnationalism and cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006) project. However, there is a persisting tension between these movements and the enduring nation-state fuelled ideas of difference and belonging. As Bulmer and Solomos (1998) have pointed out, border crossing and border challenging is often underpinned by inequalities, hostilities and conflict. Such conflicts are part of the complex backdrop of race and class, which require various levels of re-engagement.

De-racing and De-classing the Debate?
It seems that a major characteristic of the relationship between multicultural analyses, cultural sociological observations and interculturalism is precisely the over culturalisation and de-politicisation of experiences. Anti-racist discourse (accepting the diversity in ‘discourses’ and their political contexts) in the form sustained by, for example, the Institute of Race Relations continues to maintain a notable presence and vigilance against forms of race related discrimination. Authors such as Virdee (2010) articulate the need
to frame and redraw the multiculturalism and race debate along the lines of historical materialism and the continued impact of unequal economic relations. In engaging with ‘debates on difference’ in the contemporary era, there is an increasing importance in maintaining connection with a material analysis of experiences. Lentin (2008: 313) asks an important question of the ‘positive turn’ – the turn away from the perceived negativity of ‘anti-politics’ towards the ‘celebration of diversity’ – namely, what happens next? A similar question can be asked of the current debates and themes of this paper – where does the debate move to if this is a post-racial age but within which race is still an undeniably lived experience? The ‘post-race-ness’ stance within these frameworks of diversity may be side stepping crucial identifications of oppression and inequalities, hidden beneath the multiple layers of ‘attitudinal surveys’ (e.g. Department for Communities and Local Government 2011).

Interculturalism indicates that systems of globalisation, freedom of capital, and movement of labour (Cantle 2012) positively corrode insular, individualist notions of identity. This apparently leads almost magically to forms of cosmopolitan, international, hybrid allegiances which transcend outdated notions of ‘race’. Interculturalism’s defiant stance toward race thinking in a contemporary socio-political landscape riddled with populist political spinning (for example, with the moveable feast that is immigration), appears to be somewhat matter out of place. The weight of evidence which indicates current immigration discourse is still mobilising the ever present tropes of dangerous and economically / culturally draining foreigners is overwhelming (Grayson 2013; Burnett 2013). This, then, raises an important question about discourses around multiculturalism and ‘interculturality’ – where are ‘they’ located now and where might they be located in the possible future, given the changing national and global landscape in economic and psycho-social manifestation of reactions to different ‘others’? These are pertinent questions given as current UK government policies rapidly transcending the right of centre position, and populist parties such as UKIP take a stronger position in national politics. We necessarily need to raise concerns about the politised reactions to ‘others’. As Hall in his intellectual questioning of what a ‘more profoundly inclusive British-ness’ might require argued, ‘unstable localisms, spaces of proliferating difference ultimately become communities in translation’ (2000: 217, cited in Jaggi 2000).

While Modood (2005) has already called for multicultural approaches that recognise and tackle multiple racisms and different forms of discrimination, there appears to be more room for an incorporation of Sivanandan’s (1977) early arguments in anti-racism and trade union racism regarding the conditions he thinks would be absolute prerequisites for an ‘inter-racial working-class agency’. In Sivanandan’s early writings, there is a necessity for racialised, discriminated groups to raise their class consciousness through ‘colour’ consciousness, and for ‘white’ people, a recovery of class awareness through understanding and consciousness of racial oppression. In a contemporary multi-ethnic, linguistic, and culturally globalised world, clearly such stark binarism could not do justice to social complexity. And yet it redirects our attention to the idea of consciousness of materiality – and how this is played out against the backdrop of racialised differences. There appears to be some scope for a re-engagement with this modality, certainly in the way in which interculturalism defends its universalistic, intergroup dialogue driven emphasis. As Virdee (2000, 2010) has argued, independent, autonomous self-organisation was crucial in the gradual solidifying of class solidarity, importantly involving white organised labour. This mobilisation of political and practical unity was an invaluable, pragmatic tool in furthering race-class dialectical analysis in the context of understanding the world through a historical materialism that allowed for agency. The point I emphasise here is that whilst globalisation and transnational labour and capital movement makes the class-race relationship ever more complex, this should
not detract from the fact that racialised structural and economic inequalities endure in the UK. These perpetual mechanisms of exclusion will require more than locally acted and state driven versions of a national identity narrative, even less so one which is built on fragile conceptual ground.

It is the intersectionality and multiplicity of inequalities which have driven wedges between groups of identified ethnic and cultural unities, not the presence of multiculturalism as policy or practice (Rattansi 2011). Evidence for these structural inequalities is now well established and, in relation to cohesion (indicated by trust), there is also a well-established array of evidence to indicate that trust is lowest in the poorest areas (c.f. Crowley and Hickman 2008). So, whilst a plethora of empirical research and theoretical progress exists and continues to re-assert the importance of this multiple consciousness of structural contexts to racial and ethnic division, the populist sentiment as well as policy direction rests on the lack of cohesive glue between communities (Bourne 2007). Race as a modality of subjugated experience and divisive entity is still very much alive, enacted and operates through organised / institutionalised forms as well as unorganised and violent everyday action (Lentin and Titley 2011). We may very well be ‘post-race’, but as Lentin (2008) points out, socio-economic contexts continue to have a huge impact on racialised experiences. ‘Post-race’ does not, therefore, mean post-racialisation, and academic debates about race nomenclature do not prevent racist violence – practical or symbolic.

The links between apparently looking forward through globalised lenses towards interculturalism and dismissing the revolutionary and resistance movements which fought and won race and equality battles appear in relief. The gradual silencing of race under a ‘new’, analytical regime of contact, mixing, assimilationist integration is less challenging to state fuelled muscular liberal-ism than the presence of muscular dissidence. Indeed, “banal interactions” (Cantle 2012: 148) are identified as a significant component to intercultural dialogue (exchanging greetings as ‘chit-chat’). This may over-simplify many of the complex interactional and structural operations which might be involved in these frameworks of diversity. Cantle (2012), for example, contends that interculturalism, as contrasted against intercultural dialogue, ‘involves wider commu-nity, structural and political processes’ (2012: 157). The discourse in the area itself, however, consistently utilises these simple tropes (inter-actions between people via the newsagent, the local shopkeeper and the school gates). My cri-tique is by no means without support – Meer and Modood are vehemently critical of this attempt to “…displace the political; to critique a political multiculturalism with an apolitical, local-encounters-based individualism”. (2012b: 235). These tropes do not allow for the constant interplay of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations of racialised subjugation, the enduring and recycled legacies of colonialism, nor the stark realities of colourised and ethnicised markers of difference, such as skin colour, cultural and religious adornments and dress. As Sivanandan reminds us, some of us live with: “…racism that cannot tell a settler from an immigrant, an immigrant from an asylum seeker, an asylum seeker from a Muslim, a Muslim from a terrorist. All of us non-whites, at first sight, are terrorists or illegals. We wear our passports on our faces”. (2008: xv).

This deficit then throws into question the ability of these frameworks to hold significant emancipatory purchase during a time of increasing turbulence throughout not only European but global political debates concerning immigration. The recent debacle around the UK Home Office immigration ‘initiatives’, which involved the placement of vans displaying threatening messages to would-be illegal immigrants, was enacted using official state machinery and all the apparatuses available at the time, including UK Border Agency and British Transport police staff (Grayson 2013). What Grayson calls the ‘main-streaming’ and ‘embedding’ of racism into Brit-ish politics is also part of the current ideological transition facing communities at the moment.
The sanitisation of racism, via various cultural, faith, security and immigration risk-tropes is really the politics of reasonable prejudice, and might not be fully contained, articulated or managed by interculturalist approaches in a manner which facilitate an understanding of both old and new forms of racialised oppression.

**Intersectional Possibilities?**

In this section, I raise the question of where intersectionality can sit if interculturalism is charged with the resolution of problems related to a multi-ethnic UK. My principal point is that in the process of moving away from the race-class consciousness that informed multiculturalism (if not completely characterised it), there is a differential cost of omitting these layers of context for black and minority people. It is yet another missed opportunity to take strength from a fuller, radicalised and political questioning of policy, academic discourse and practice, which does not treat the intersectionality as trivial. Whilst I do not intend to exhaustively rehearse the well-established arguments in the field of intersectionality, a number of broad brush strokes to describe the approach may help in contextualising the impacts of neglecting it. Firstly, why do I invoke the area of intersectionality here? The answer lies in the sociological and anthropological insight that racism and racialisation (Miles 1989) are not limited to binary oppositions, nor is racial discrimination characterised solely by reference to race (Song 2014). Intersectionality brings into the debate not just the unreducible facticity of cultural diversity (Parekh 2000a) but fully recognises the interlinking of subjugating experiences on a range of dimensions. Thus Anthias (1989) and Yuval-Davis (1997) have consistently articulated the importance of viewing social divisions through an intersectional lens. Rather than treating race and gender as epiphenomena – playing second fiddle to the ‘real’ issue of class relations ‘...classes are always gendered and racialised and gender is always classed and racialised...’ (Anthias 2010: 241). As Song (2014) reminds us, while there needs to be a vigilant activism and discussion concerning structural, White hegemonic fuelled discrimination, especially in light of institutional racism (Pilkington 2011), a one-size-fits-all approach simply cannot do justice to the many ways in which dimensions of difference are interlinked. This reinforces one of the main aims of this paper, to emphasise that interculturalist based critique of multiculturalism is facilitated by a gradual reduction of racialised experiences to ‘diversity’ and ‘citizenship’ based debates. The implication of these reductions is a de-racing and de-classing pattern, which fundamentally undermines the ethos of interacting and cooperating diverse societies.

Regardless of whether we engage with the ‘new interculturality’ (Cantle 2012), racist attacks, racist verbal and physical abuse, and institutional racism all persist (IRR 2012). Importantly, as bell hooks (1994) has cogently and persistently argued the normalised, routinized, mundane acceptance (for all parties) of racialization of everyday social action is an eroding force in collective civil societies. There appears to be then a place for an interrelated and integrated approach to anti-racist, citizenship based ‘critical multiculturalism’ (Farrar 2012) at both policy and civic level which does not operate simply on the ‘incident-based’ reactive level. Rather, it works on the overwhelmingly evidenced existence of what hooks (1994), discussing North American values, has consistently called the ‘white supremacist capitalist patriarchy’. These networks of economic, material, and intellectual hegemonised racism perpetuate negative representations and resist any form of dissent activated from within subjugated racialised groups. This empowerment / resistance framework may be explicitly useful here because an integrated multi-disciplinary approach necessarily needs to look at the insights brought into focus by academics and activists working at the margins of discourse but at the centre of intersectionality. Such an approach facilitates a critical engagement with and between the practical and symbolic markers of difference – the lived and abstracted realities – as crucial for full cultural and political citizenship.
Although in terms of policy recognition there is widespread approval and utilisation of intersectional approaches (Anthias 2012), there is doubt about the level of criticality that approaches can engage in when one takes into account the relative activist-state positioning of research and interventions. In other words, if interculturalism purports to force through centralised policies of for example ‘community cohesion’, to what extent could those same policies allow for an internally critical gaze? State led formulations of ‘national’ identity would fundamentally need to be questioned.

In the case of Intersectionality and interculturalism, there is a sense that through gaining a national citizenship based unity through dialogue and communication, racialised and gendered subjugation become secondary and peripheral. Structures of subjugation rarely operate on one dimension so current discourse necessarily needs to be involved in analysis of several frames of experience simultaneously. Without a properly systematic and organised engagement with voices of resistance and empowerment, forms of internalised, habituated and embodied subjugation will be glossed over in favour of populist ideas which seem to corroborate the constructed need to ‘citizenise.’

Where are the Other ‘Others’?

As some minority groups become more visible and ‘problematised’, others appear to be performing a disappearing act, seemingly deemed ‘correctly’ or ‘safely’ integrated, as contrasted to other groups constructed as ‘troublesome’, or examples of ‘poor’ integration. I intend to highlight this seemingly conspicuous absence as having an impact on the landscape of multi-cultural negotiation. This leads me to ask if recent negative, ideological constructions of Muslims in the UK (and Europe), as well as much needed reactions from academics intending to contest these negative constructions, have left their mark on the multicultural landscape in the form of homegenising and neglecting the existence of problems in these other, ‘other’ communities?

Many of the issues focused upon to mobilise this new hybridised left/right political rhetoric – in the service of creating new symbolic, practical and political boundaries of tolerance have been about Muslims communities – people, practices and beliefs (Lentin and Tittley 2011; Kundnani 2012; Ahmad and Modood 2007). This raises a question around those communities in Britain which, although traditionally were part of the mainstream focus of ‘race relations’ and ethnicity discourse (Ballard 1994), have now been relatively hidden from the spotlight. The attention seems to have turned away from the continued racialised experience of for example South Asian Hindus and Black African Caribbean populations, and shifted towards Muslim based discriminatory discourse. Moreover, simply because the mainstream academic focus has shifted does not mean we can assume that the everyday, lived experience of other groups in the UK does not continue to be characterised and punctuated by many different forms of subjugation. Kundnani (2012) perceives there to be a widespread (ideological and expedient) pessimism about ‘… resolving this supposed crisis of Muslim identity and liberal values through conventional democratic processes...’ (2012: 158). Does this invisibility imply that other minority groups have now been successfully ‘integrated’ and therefore no longer pose a challenge to the neo-imperial and neo-colonial philosophical and political ontologies underpinning British democratic citizenhood? Since relatively little material seems to be emerging in this debate around these groups (exceptions are Zavos 2009; Mawani and Mukadam 2012), it might be useful to maintain a critical resistance against the rapid transformation of racialised discourse into anti-Muslim discrimination. A continued examination of the burdens and dynamic tensions in people’s lives when they are subject to what Back and Sinha call ‘the social weight of racism’ (2012: 13) would need to remain critical about this apparently differential integration into ‘Englishness’ or ‘Britishness’.

This supposed differential ‘Englishness’ felt by different cultural, ethnic and religious groups...
is interestingly evoked by Uberoi and Modood (2010: 312) and highlighted in an interview with David Blunkett (the then Home Secretary) in 2008, who stated: ‘The Hindu community have managed not to be the focal point of bitterness and hatred...because there’s very much a larger middle class, and wherever you have a larger middle class...then integration, social cohesion go hand in hand...’. Blunkett performs the function of reinforcing existing stereotypes about ‘bad’ migrants and ‘good’ migrants, and secondly manages to homogenise an entire range of groups differentiated by geographical and class origin, dialect, caste, and crucially material position. In many ways this raises the more general question about the ‘absent presence’ of other ‘others’, and more specifically about the unwillingness to acknowledge the continuity in adverse socio-economic positions among groups. As Kundnani summarises, ‘...the crises of multiculturalism discourse erases the complex histories of settlement and interaction which have characterised actual multiculturalism in Britain, and this discourse is stubbornly ignorant of the multiple meanings that multiculturalism has always had’ (2012: 158). If we are to consider this seriously in light of recent academic moves in critical citizenship based multiculturalism and interculturalism, then we need to remain vigilant against over simplifying who it is that remains at the ‘impact end’ of these practices.

The politically, economically and ideologically expedient dismissal and somewhat mysterious disappearance of these other, non-Muslim groups from debate and discussion reflects attempts at a “unified discourse of identity” (Kundnani 2012: 159). The ideological hybridisation of left-wing, right wing, conservative and liberal ideas of citizenship and belonging, result in what Lentin and Titley (2011) call ‘assimilationist integration policies’. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that new integrationist tendencies (to do ostensibly with culture and citizenship, rather than explicitly race and belonging) are part of the liberal struggles to attain rights in the arenas of sexual freedom, secular citizenship, and expression.

I make this point because there appears to be a similar, symbolic and practical move reflected in the focus on interculturality. Political rhetoric in this direction also implicitly accepts some minority groups (specifically middle class Hindu groups in the UK) who have been a feature of established migrant networks as a feature of the British landscape. Their ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ are constructed as complete therefore do not re-emerge as ‘troublesome’ in any symbolic or practical way. Cameron’s 2011 Munich speech firmly asserting “Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism”, was clearly not aimed at British Hindus when he visited a temple in North West London, as part of the 2013 annual Diwali festival. Indeed, in a speech given at this visit, he was instead aligning his idealised British, muscular liberalism with the beliefs, practices, and value of this group of accepted others, arguing that the values of the UK’s Indian community should be “ever more involved” in shaping British life (Asian Image 2013). Such official and state sanctioned openness can be traced in the history of both modern British government (Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as Prime Ministers all publically visited Hindu Temples in the UK) and colonial and imperial legacy (Suleri 1992).

The history of diversity in the UK proves that some groups have been in positions where mobilisation of networks, length of established settlement and the inherited economic, biographical and migration legacies have been favourable. How the state utilises its cultural and racial gaze will form part of the normalising, nationalist civilising gaze. These differential ‘otherings’ need to be located as examples of cultural racialisation; otherwise, the uneven shifts in cultural, economic, and political power lead to injustices to those groups who still occupy positions outside of and below this hierarchy. This automatically dismisses the continued differential advantages and disadvantages that can exist in the experiences of a diverse group of people, and negates the possibility that within
these non-Muslim groups there also exist political ideologies, expression and notions of counter liberal beliefs. These ‘closed-chapter’ narratives, exemplified by the state’s congratulatory stance on Asian business development and ‘contributions’ to the UK (BBC News 2007), also fail to acknowledge the political, ideological and economic divisions which mediate associated relationships between caste and class. Recent research (Metcalf and Rolfe 2010) indicates that discrimination based on caste is an important positive and negative feature of many UK South Asian communities, further indicating that these particular chapters on assumed ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’ are far from closed.

How, then, will progress in critical debates about difference take into account these shifting and temporal positions within a social and political landscape which itself appears to be in ideological and practical flux? The named ‘crises of multiculturalism’ has emerged as a practical and symbolic crossroads, brought together by new European integrationist liberal notions of citizenship, fully awake to a wide variety of geo-political fragilities (Kundnani 2012). These insecurities operate not just in processes currently within the academic and policy analysis discourses but also on an everyday, lived and embodied level (Back and Sinha 2012).

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have argued that contemporary discussions regarding interculturalism’s better fit for dealing with diversity is problematic and simplistically conceptualised. I have drawn on Meer and Modood’s (2012a; 2012b) tackling of these comparisons. In discussing these issues, I assert that the interculturalist’s critique of multiculturalism, especially the policy-backed directions, is particularly troublesome because it neglects some important considerations. The prominence of ‘diversity’ in all its forms, an emphasis on universality, forms of allegiance to constructed national identities, and the ubiquity of ‘cohesion’ policies have a de-racing and de-classing effect on the debate. Such impacts then hinder the way in which enduring experiences of systematic racialised subjugation can be mitigated by intersectional analyses. The importance of multi-faceted approaches to the study of inequalities and intervention in the discursive processes of power relations cannot be underestimated. They can, however, be undermined by wholesale rejection of multiculturalism in favour of intercultural approaches. Finally, I raise a question about the processes of differential treatment of minorities as they become subject to varying politically expedient gazes. Some minorities are deemed acceptable, having achieved the prescriptive level of ‘integration’ or are regarded as more culturally malleable. Others such as the various Muslim communities in the UK have been deemed troublesome, and a threat to national British identity, public order and national security. These debates play out against a backdrop of critique railed towards the constructions of multicultural failures, and are part of contemporary, ideological power relations in the arena of race, diversity, culture and identity. The question remains focused on how the UK and its counterparts in mainland Europe can mobilise the political and ideological will to remain vigilant against the worst excesses of fear-fuelled conceptualisations of the ‘other’. Continuing to reframe citizenship within an intersectional understanding of materiality, race and difference, within an understanding of inclusive citizenship requires a re-engagement with the success of multiculturalism. These observations and critiques raise some questions about the impacts of new frameworks of diversity and difference which may relegate notions of racism, class and differential othering to secondary importance.

**References**


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